



STRATEGY REPORT · STRATEGIC RISK ASSESSMENT

Ceuta 2026

Strategy and risk after the mass entry of 30–31 July

SPAIN · MOROCCO · EUROPEAN UNION

Analytical cut-off 24 September 2026 (updated after the Moroccan elections of 23-Sep)

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Scenarios 90-day horizon · monitoring horizon: 31 December 2026

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RESTRICTED USE · UNCLASSIFIED

01 · KEY JUDGMENTS

Five judgments that structure the report

Each judgment carries its epistemic tag and its confidence level. Verified facts are kept separate from J&H's own reading.

KJ-1

FACT

HIGH

The entry of 30–31 July was on a much larger scale than in 2021; its final toll still has no single figure.

The Spanish Government puts the entries at around 70,000 people (Sánchez, 3 and 9 September); the spokesperson for Morocco's Interior Ministry spoke of around 40,000. In May 2021 there were more than 8,000 in 48 hours according to Spain's Interior Ministry (around 9,000 according to CESEDEN's Strategic Outlook 2026). Most returned to Morocco within hours or days. Today around 10,000 people remain according to government sources and around 13,000 according to the Ceuta city government.

KJ-2

JUDGMENT

MODERATE

Preliminary evidence supports an assessment of permissiveness by Moroccan forces; there is no established evidence of state direction.

An early-September order from the Audiencia Nacional refers to conduct facilitating the crossings from the Moroccan side, and, according to press reports, a CENIF report holds that there was active facilitation. The Spanish Government states there is no conclusive proof of authorship; Rabat denies involvement. The proceedings are at the preliminary-investigation stage. J&H's reference scenario treats permissiveness as probable and state intent as an open hypothesis. On 21 September, Sánchez told CNN it is "evident" that Moroccan control "failed", after denying on 9 September that there was solid evidence against Rabat; Vivas replied on 23 September that there had been "active or passive" collaboration. Neither statement provides new evidence on H2 or H3.

KJ-3**FACT****HIGH****JUDGMENT****MODERATE**

STS 814/2026 changed the operational framework at the border; its significance as a potential trigger is an analytical judgment, not an established fact.

Fact: STS 814/2026 (29 June; communicated by the CGPJ on 8 July) ruled out rejection at the border for those entering by swimming. Spain's Interior Ministry and Morocco's Interior Ministry cite it as a pull factor. The ruling itself accepts that maritime containment elements could restore that regime; since 1 August a 500 m pneumatic barrier has been installed at the Tarajal breakwater. Judgment: J&H considers that the ruling may have acted as a facilitating factor together with the calls on social media and the permissiveness in surveillance; no source shows it was the sole cause.

KJ-4**JUDGMENT****MODERATE**

Risk over the next 90 days depends more on the coincidence of calendars and triggers than on a literal repeat of 30–31 July.

The Moroccan election campaign and vote (23 September) with unanimous sovereigntist rhetoric and an official 10-September statement warning of "recurring tensions"; institutional tension in Spain; saturation of Ceuta's reception capacity; and two undated triggers, the Sahrawi nationality law and the royal visit. Spanish sovereignty is not legally in question — the European Parliament reaffirmed it on 17 September — but it is being politically instrumentalised, with contradictory messages coming out of the US and the European Parliament itself.

KJ-5**ASSESSMENT****MODERATE**

The economic and reputational cost of Ceuta could extend beyond the migration phase itself.

The Chamber of Commerce puts direct losses at €33 M up to 31 August and estimates €170.1 M in indirect damage. These are stakeholder estimates, not audited figures. For organisations operating in the city, Ceuta now presents heightened border and operational-continuity risks.

J&H ANALYTICAL VIEW

The system rests on a cooperation both sides need and neither can exercise without an internal political cost. That is the central variable to monitor in this report.

What has changed since 19 September

Covers the milestones of 20 and 23 September. It does not replace the rest of the report, which is cut off at 19 September except for this page and the specific adjustments flagged in the text.

FACT

Legislative elections in Morocco (23 September)

The Authenticity and Modernity Party (PAM) wins, with 97 of the 395 seats, ahead of the National Rally of Independents (RNI, 66), Istiqlal (65) and the Justice and Development Party (PJD, moderate Islamist, up from 13 to 54). Abstention reached 61.9–62%, the highest in twenty years, with turnout of 38.02%. PAM, RNI and Istiqlal already made up the outgoing coalition; no reliable source confirms whether they will keep it or who will lead the next government.

FACT

Ceuta's border on election day (23 September)

There were calls on social media to cross by taking advantage of the Moroccan election day. The border stayed calm, reinforced by around 1,300 National Police and Civil Guard officers on the Ceuta side and around 3,000 Moroccan personnel on the Fnideq side. The SUP police union claimed, without confirmation from the Interior Ministry, that around 150 people had tried to swim across at Benzú; four people were detained in Fnideq after clashes with Moroccan forces. No new mass entry was recorded.

JUDGMENT

LOW

The 20-September call

The "march of anger" called for on Moroccan social media for 20 September outside the Spanish Embassy in Rabat had no identified organiser. No public account of its turnout, route or whether it even took place has been located; a separate call, with no confirmed link to the first, urged crossing the border on election day (23 September).

FACT**Statements by Sánchez and Vivas**

On 21 September, in New York, Sánchez told CNN it is "evident" that Moroccan border control "failed" and that Spain has asked Rabat for "answers and action"; this qualifies what he said on 9 September, when he stated there was no solid evidence against Morocco. On 23 September, Vivas replied that a "failure" does not explain how 80,000 people mobilised without Moroccan authorities knowing, and argued there had been "active or passive" collaboration. J&H does not consider that either statement provides new evidence on H2 or H3.

FACT**The Tarajal breakwater**

The Ceuta city government reported that the buoy system was partially submerged. The Interior Ministry began proceedings to extend the breakwater with a 100 m wall of "inverted combs" to replace the provisional floating barrier.

J&H ANALYTICAL VIEW

None of these facts alone justifies moving the report's risk bands or scenarios: there was no new mass entry, the border held under pressure, and attribution remains unresolved. The most significant change is in the discourse, not in facts on the ground: for the first time the Government itself acknowledges a failure of Moroccan control, which could raise tension around R4 if Rabat reads it as a public accusation. J&H is keeping the bands unchanged and will track the outcome of government formation in Morocco and Rabat's response to Sánchez's statement.

02 · EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**What happened, what is documented and what is not**

On 30 July, during the Moroccan Feast of the Throne, thousands of people crossed by sea and via the Tarajal breakwater into Ceuta. Seven weeks later, the emergency has given way to a management phase marked by saturated capacity, a judicial investigation and political dispute.

FACT

Immediate background

Between 20 and 26 July, the Civil Guard recorded 279 swimming entries into Ceuta and Melilla (205 in Ceuta), 195 more than the previous week (CCOE note, 29 July). According to the Interior Ministry, there had been no sea arrivals in Ceuta in 2026 until 15 July; there were four in 2025 and 28 in 2024. On 29 July, the CNI intelligence service informed the Government Delegation of calls on social media for an "assault by fence and sea" the following day, and passed a note to Moroccan services.

FACT

What the 40 declassified documents show

The Government published, on 9 September, reports and communications from 1 to 31 July (CNI, National Police, Civil Guard, CIFAS). They confirm prior warnings and "very high risk" ratings for swimming entries. None anticipates an entry of 70,000–80,000 people, nor does any prove by itself that Morocco organised it; several describe passivity by Moroccan forces once the situation had already overwhelmed capacity.

FACT

Current phase

Reception capacity rose from 500 to more than 6,000 places (Sánchez, 14 September), with a target close to 10,000. On 18 September, 1,700 people were moved to the port facility, with capacity of around 1,800; an estimated more than 4,000 people remained between Benítez beach and El Trampolín. The Audiencia Nacional denied the SUP union's urgent injunction request (17 September) and admitted its appeal for processing (announced 19 September). On 27 August, neighbourhood protests led to a blockade of the Red Cross, the burning of belongings at informal settlements and police charges; according to police, around 70 migrants attacked a vehicle carrying four soldiers that day and twelve were arrested (Euronews, El Progreso). On 25 August, Royal Decree 681/2026 declared the situation in Ceuta of interest to National Security until 31 December, renewable, and designated the Minister for Territorial Policy as Functional Authority, or "single command" (BOE, 26 August).

DISPUTED FIGURES

FACT

SOURCE BY CELL

ITEM	SPANISH GOVERNMENT	OTHER SOURCES	ANALYTICAL VIEW
Entries 30–31 Jul	≈70,000 (Sánchez, 3 and 9 Sep); Interior Ministry gave 72,000 (4 Aug)	≈40,000 (Moroccan Interior Ministry, 2 Aug); 80,000 (Vivas, 3 Aug)	No audited figure
Deaths	75 (Marlaska, 4 Aug)	83 confirmed in Spanish waters (Audiencia Nacional); 88 (Ceuta, 3 Aug); 141 (EP resolution); 41 (Le360, 31 Jul); 11 (Morocco, 2 Aug)	Verification ongoing
Remaining in Ceuta	≈10,000 (government sources, 18 Sep); 2,000 on 4 Aug	13,000 (Ceuta city government, 16 Sep)	Figure under continuous review
Minors identified	2,140 processed (Torres, 16 Sep)	2,100 housed and 700–1,000 unhoused (Ceuta, 16 Sep)	Only partly compatible
Returns and expulsions	70,000 (Interior Ministry, 4 Aug); since 10 Aug: 5,603 returns and 307 expulsions (Torres, 15–16 Sep)	73,000 departures (Vivas, 3 Aug)	Definitions not aligned

Sources: Maldita.es (18 Sep), La Moncloa (Government), Público, La Cerca/EP, Le360, Infobae; the figure of 70,000 also appears in the House of Commons Library. Full detail and URLs in the Source Annex (section 11).

J&H ANALYTICAL VIEW

The divergence in figures is itself a risk variable. Without a single, audited figure, any plan that depends on the size of the remaining population should work with ranges rather than point values.

03 · KEY MESSAGES FOR DECISION-MAKERS

Five operational messages

Here the analytical judgments are translated into action-oriented messages for institutions and organisations exposed to the Spain–Morocco–Strait axis.

1 Separate three analytical layers that media coverage tends to conflate: documented facts, attribution under investigation, and election-campaign rhetoric.

30–31 July is a fact; authorship is a hypothesis under judicial investigation; the Moroccan territorial claim is, at this stage, campaign rhetoric according to Rabat itself. Conflating these analytical levels leads to misjudging exposure.

2 Treat Ceuta as an operational-continuity risk, not a sovereignty risk.

Spanish sovereignty has constitutional backing, the position of the United Nations — which does not include Ceuta and Melilla among the territories pending decolonisation — and the European Parliament resolution. The material exposure lies in the border, logistics, tourism and institutional capacity.

3 Do not assume that cooperation and alignment are the same thing.

Rabat cooperates on returns and containment — the Interior Ministry calls it a "reliable partner" — while several of its ministers claim Ceuta and Melilla during campaigning. Both can coexist: according to the Maghreb chapter of CESEDEN's Strategic Outlook 2026 (pp. 161 and 163–164), being an unavoidable partner in migration control strengthens Rabat's negotiating power with Brussels, and its distancing from the EU is more rhetorical than material (in 2024, 59% of its trade was with the EU, per that chapter). The relationship is instrumental in both directions.

4 Anticipate the calendar, not the headline.

The 20 September call, the Moroccan elections on the 23rd, the expiry on 8 October of Spain's extension of controls with Italy, and judicial deadlines all create windows of greater volatility worth identifying before they open.

5 Prepare for the continuity of services and organisations that operate in or depend on Ceuta and the Strait.

Contingency plans for border closures or restrictions, use of port facilities for reception, cancellations and cost overruns; review of applicable clauses and coverage.

KEY TAKEAWAY FOR DECISION-MAKERS

The decision-relevant question is not whether to take a position on attribution, but how to calibrate exposure to a border whose normal state has changed: it now operates with heavier surveillance, saturated capacity and conditional cooperation.

04 · CRITICAL VARIABLES

The system's drivers

The variables that define the risk operate on three overlapping levels. J&H's taxonomy orders them from the systemic to the local.

SYSTEMIC LEVEL**The Spain–Morocco relationship in electoral terms and external context**

The main Moroccan parties unanimously argued that Ceuta and Melilla are Moroccan at rallies ahead of the 23 September campaign (EFE, 10 September). Albares maintains that Bourita attributed those statements to the electoral context and not to the State's official position; the Moroccan Foreign Ministry's public statement of 10 September, its first official reaction, is harsher: it denies any involvement, rejects being a "pre-election pawn" or "scapegoat", and warns that "strategic blindness" will generate "recurring tensions" (Público, El Independiente). Externally, the European Parliament (339–225–16, 17 September) reaffirmed Spanish sovereignty and called for conditioning Morocco's preferential access to the EU market and its funding on border cooperation. NATO's representative for the Southern Neighbourhood considered Article 5 conceptually applicable to hybrid campaigns while acknowledging the definition remains "somewhat undefined". The US national security strategy of November 2025 does not mention the Maghreb (CESEDEN, p. 158).

As a framework, the Maghreb chapter of CESEDEN's Strategic Outlook 2026 describes transactional multi-alignment and the use of diplomatic crises as leverage (pp. 160–165), with Western Sahara as the axis of Moroccan foreign policy (p. 165) and the 2025 Gen Z 212 protests as internal backdrop (p. 157); that campaign rhetoric might serve to deflect that discontent is a press reading. It also notes fragmented European action among southern capitals (p. 166), consistent with the Spain–Italy divergence, and recalls that, per its wording, the CJEU annulled in 2024 the application of the trade agreement to Western Sahara (p. 164; the exact wording should be verified against the ruling), which complicates the market-access conditionality requested by the European Parliament.

STATE LEVEL

Legal-operational framework and cohesion of Spanish institutions

Four elements condition the capacity to respond: (i) the gap between STS 814/2026 and the practice of border rejection, which the maritime barrier only partly covers; (ii) the application of the Migration and Asylum Pact, applicable since 12 June 2026 (the Crisis Regulation, since 1 July); (iii) friction between the Interior Ministry and the National Police after the CENIF report: Marlaska asked the Police Directorate-General for explanations and conveyed his concern to the president of the CGPJ; (iv) the declaration of a situation of interest to National Security (RD 681/2026, with annexes amended by RD 706/2026), with the Minister for Territorial Policy as Functional Authority, a Situation Committee that includes the Government Delegation, and an express clause: the Functional Authority's guidelines do not alter the allocation of powers or existing chains of command. In Congress, the PP demands the president's resignation and elections (Feijóo, 3 September) and Vox focuses its demand on the president; within the governing bloc, Sumar holds that Morocco had a role "by action or omission" and Podemos calls for Marlaska's dismissal and a break in relations.

CITY AND BUSINESS LEVEL

Local capacity and economic exposure

Ceuta has around 83,000 inhabitants across 18.5 km². If between 10,000 and 13,000 irregular migrants remain, that would equal between 12% and 16% of the resident population (J&H calculation: $10,000 \div 83,000 \approx 12\%$; $13,000 \div 83,000 \approx 16\%$). Retail and hospitality are seeing declines of more than 50% according to the Chamber of Commerce, and the lodging sector expects cancellations of up to 90% in September according to the CECE employers' association. Ceuta's economy depends heavily on the public sector and on a functioning border.

KEY TAKEAWAY FOR DECISION-MAKERS

The decisive intersection combines the systemic level and the local level: if electoral tension and institutional strain coincide with a substantial remaining unhoused population, a lesser incident could escalate with little remaining capacity to absorb further shocks.

Sources: EFE/Infobae and swissinfo (10 Sep), Infobae (8 Sep), El Independiente (13 Sep), La Cerca (17 Sep), Infodefensa (17 Sep), moncloa.com (3 and 4 Sep), Ceutaldia (30 Aug), Nexotur, INE via Newtral/EP, CESEDEN (Strategic Outlook 2026, ch. 6).

05 · MATERIAL RISKS

Nine risks, with driver and band

90-day horizon. The bands are J&H ESTIMATES with MODERATE to LOW confidence; they are not point probabilities. The coloured dot indicates impact: red, high; amber, medium.

#	RISK	PRIMARY DRIVER	BAND	IMPACT
R1	Coordinated attempts by hundreds of people to enter	Dated calls on social media; swimming routes; relaxed surveillance during holidays; the precedent of 15 August, thwarted according to Albares.	 MEDIUM 40–60	● Medium
R2	New mass entry comparable to July's	Breakdown of Moroccan border control or a deliberate decision; conditional on developments after 23 September.	 VERY LOW 5–20	● High
R3	Saturation and conflict in Ceuta (informal settlements, coexistence)	Between 3,000 and 4,000 people unhoused according to government sources; port capacity around 1,800; judicial appeal pending. Already partly materialised: on 27 August there was a blockade of the Red Cross, burning of belongings and police charges (Euronews, El Progreso).	 HIGH 60–80	● High
R4	Diplomatic friction and selective cooperation from Rabat	Sovereigntist campaign rhetoric and the 10-September statement warning of "recurring tensions"; possible hardening on readmission and security cooperation after the vote. Potential accelerating factor: Sánchez's visit to Algiers on 20 July, with a bilateral summit planned for October (La Moncloa). Precedent: dialogue with the EU interrupted in 2016–2019 (CESEDEN, p. 165).	 MEDIUM 40–60	● High
R5	Legal-institutional instability in Spain	Audiencia Nacional investigation; SUP union appeal; Interior–Police tension; parliamentary pressure.	 HIGH 60–80	● Medium
R6	Intra-EU fracture within Schengen	Reciprocal Spain–Italy controls (Spain's extended to 8 October); European Parliament call to review how Schengen is functioning; fragmented European action among southern capitals (CESEDEN, p. 166).	 MEDIUM 40–60	● Medium
R7	Persistent economic deterioration in Ceuta	Fall in retail and hospitality; cancellations; loss of investor confidence; border dependency. LOW confidence: rests on estimates from the Chamber of Commerce and the employers' association, without objective data (section 10).	 HIGH 60–80	● High
R8A	Disinformation (degraded information environment)	Maldita.es has verified more than 50 hoaxes, including dated calls for new crossings; circulation of false expectations about asylum or passage to mainland Spain.	 HIGH 60–80	● Medium
R8B	Organised foreign interference (FIMI)	Cross-attributions (Sánchez pointed to Russian, Israeli and far-right networks). There is no public technical attribution linking the campaign to a foreign state actor, and fact-checkers find no conclusive evidence of coordinated operation prior to 30 July. Government denials are recorded as attributed positions, not exculpatory evidence. LOW confidence.	 LOW 20–40	● Medium

J&H ANALYTICAL VIEW

R2 occupies the lowest likelihood band while carrying the highest impact; R3, R5, R7 and R8A occupy the highest likelihood bands and are already materialising. Effective management depends more on the latter than on the former.

J&H bands: Very low 5–20 · Low 20–40 · Medium 40–60 · High 60–80 · Very high 80–95. The evidence underpinning these drivers comes from the sources cited in sections 02 and 04.

06 · DASHBOARD AND SCENARIOS**State of the system as of 24 September**

Green: favourable or strength. Amber: watch. Red: unfavourable or fragility. Blue: information context.

New mass entries**AMBER**

No repeat since 31 Jul; the 20-Sep call under watch by the National Police, Civil Guard and CNI.

Unhoused population**RED**

Between 3,000 and 4,000 in the streets, hills and beaches according to government sources (18 Sep).

Reception capacity**AMBER**

From 500 to more than 6,000 places; target close to 10,000; port at around 1,800.

Bilateral migration cooperation**AMBER**

5,603 returns and 307 expulsions since 10 August; no channel has been broken off.

Moroccan sovereigntist rhetoric**RED**

Unanimous during the campaign; official 10-Sep statement warning of "recurring tensions".

Legal grounding for sovereignty**GREEN**

Constitution, the UN's position, and the European Parliament resolution of 17 Sep.

Judicial process**AMBER**

Audiencia Nacional investigating the mass entry, including the conduct of the responding authorities; SUP union appeal admitted.

Intra-EU Schengen**AMBER**

Reciprocal Spain–Italy controls; Spain's extended to 8 October.

EU financial support

GREEN

€114.7 M in emergency aid backed by the European Parliament.

Ceuta's economy

RED

€33 M in direct losses up to 31 August; retail and hospitality down more than 50%.

Internal political cohesion

RED

Calls for resignation and elections; divergences within the governing bloc.

Disinformation

BLUE

More than 50 hoaxes verified by Maldita.es; cross-attributions without conclusive proof.

90-DAY SCENARIOS

J&H SCENARIO

LOW CONFIDENCE

Dominant states as of 31 December 2026: mutually exclusive and exhaustive for the purposes of this report.

A**Containment with friction**

Reference scenario

■■■■■ MEDIUM 40–60

No new mass entry; cooperation on returns continues after 23 Sep and rhetoric eases after the vote. Allows for isolated attempts by hundreds of people (R1).

Conditional on the Albares–Bourita channel, on returns outpacing arrivals, and on the Sahrawi law and the royal visit not widening the friction.

B**Sustained pressure and partial cooperation**

Conditional risk

■■■■■ LOW 20–40

A persistently large remaining population and informal settlements, selective cooperation from Rabat, and renewed friction in the EU, with or without attempts by hundreds of people to enter.

Will depend on government formation in Morocco and the pace of returns.

C**Breakdown of cooperation or new mass entry**

Tail risk

■■■■■ VERY LOW 5–20

Suspension of readmission or security channels, or a repeat of an entry of tens of thousands.

Would trigger a reinforced response from the EU and Frontex. Precedent for suspending channels: 2016–2019 with the EU (CESEDEN, p. 165).

Scenario bands are independent analytical ranges, not additive probability intervals; accordingly, their bounds are not expected to sum to 100% (observed range: 65%–120%). They are J&H estimates, not statistical projections. Traceability is kept in an internal annex. Methodology in section 10.

FACTORS THAT WOULD PUSH EVENTS TOWARD ONE SCENARIO OR ANOTHER

JUDGMENT

MODERATE

Outcome of the 23-Sep vote in Morocco	The composition of the next government and its tone toward Ceuta and Melilla after the vote will determine whether campaign rhetoric eases or becomes institutionalised.
Pace of returns versus arrivals	If returns sustainably outpace arrivals, the remaining population shrinks and the system regains margin; if not, saturation becomes entrenched.
Judicial rulings	Progress in the investigation into H3 would raise the political cost of cooperation for both sides; a dismissal or stalling would lower it.
EU operational support	Effective use of emergency funds and of Frontex, which the European Parliament is calling for, conditions medium-term containment capacity.

07 · MONITORING INDICATORS

What to watch and when

Eleven monitoring variables with their verified reference and alert thresholds anchored to those references. The thresholds are J&H ESTIMATES and should be recalibrated with weekly data, which today are not systematically public.

INDICATOR	VERIFIED REFERENCE	ALERT THRESHOLD (J&H ESTIMATE)
Swimming entries into Ceuta (weekly)	28 sea arrivals in 2024 and 4 in 2025 (Interior Ministry); 205 in the week of 20–26 July (CCOE note).	- More than 30 a week ($\approx$ 2024's total). - More than 200 a week (pre-30-Jul level).
Calls on social media	Groups with 180,000 followers on 29 July (CNI); the 15 August call; the 20-Sep call with no identified organiser.	- A dated call with a meeting point. - An identifiable organiser, transport logistics toward Fnideq, or circulation in groups of more than 100,000 followers.
Moroccan deployment in Fnideq and Bab Sebta	Early closure of the perimeter on 13 August (Le360).	No early closure on a date with an identified call.

INDICATOR	VERIFIED REFERENCE	ALERT THRESHOLD (J&H ESTIMATE)
Returns (weekly)	5,603 returns between 10 August and 16 September, ≈1,060 a week (J&H calculation); 307 expulsions (Torres).	- Fewer than 500 a week for two consecutive weeks. - Fewer than 250. Measures processing capacity, not a target.
Unhoused population	3,000–4,000 unhoused; more than 6,000 places; port ≈1,800; incidents of 27 August (Euronews).	- More than 1,000. - More than 3,000 (current situation) or new incidents at informal settlements.
Official Moroccan statements after 23-Sep	10-Sep Foreign Ministry statement: denies involvement and warns of "recurring tensions"; Albares attributes ministers' statements to the electoral context.	A claim in government documents or multilateral forums, not just in party rhetoric.
Sahrawi nationality law and the royal visit	Congress passed the law on 10-Sep; a royal visit was announced with no date (El Independiente).	- Date for the visit or for publication of the law fixed. - A formal Moroccan reaction (a diplomatic note, summoning of the ambassador, or suspension of a channel) on that date.
US position on sovereignty	House Appropriations Committee Report 119-631, with no force of law, annexed to the bill passed on 15 Jul (217–209), versus the State Department's "unreserved" support for Spanish sovereignty.	- New references from Congress to "future status". - A statement from the Executive branch that qualifies its support for Spanish sovereignty.
Audiencia Nacional investigation	Preliminary proceedings; the investigation covers the conduct of the responding authorities; partial secrecy requested by the Prosecutor's Office.	- Summonses for commanding officers or a letter rogatory. - Changes in the procedural status of the responding authorities or in the legal classification of the events.

INDICATOR	VERIFIED REFERENCE	ALERT THRESHOLD (J&H ESTIMATE)
Schengen controls	Italy extended its controls another 15 days on 15 September; Spain's, until 8 October.	● A third state introduces controls linked to Ceuta, or the Commission issues a formal statement.
Ceuta's economic indicators	€33 M direct; retail and hospitality down more than 50%; cancellations of up to 90% (CECE).	● Objective data confirming the fall (employment registrations, occupancy, port traffic). ● Business closures or workforce cuts.

CRITICAL CALENDAR

20 Sep	Call on Moroccan social media for a "popular march" outside the Spanish Embassy in Rabat; no public account of whether it took place or its turnout has been located (El Faro de Melilla).
23 Sep	Legislative elections: PAM wins (97/395 seats), followed by RNI (66), Istiqlal (65) and PJD, up from 13 to 54; abstention of 61.9–62%, the highest in twenty years (El Español, COPE). Ceuta's border with no confirmed incidents; the SUP union claimed, without Interior Ministry confirmation, ≈150 attempts to swim across at Benzú (Infobae, El Cierre Digital).
8 Oct	Spain's extension of controls on travellers from Italy expires; any further extension requires a new reasoned decision (Interior Ministry). Italy extended its own another 15 days on 15 September.
≈ Oct	Twenty-day deadline for the Transport Ministry to send the Audiencia Nacional the file on the port facility (date unconfirmed); 8th Spain–Algeria High-Level Meeting (La Moncloa, 20 Jul).
No date	Royal visit to Ceuta, announced on 10-Sep, and processing of the Sahrawi nationality law passed that day by Congress (dates pending confirmation; section 10).
31 Dec	The declaration of a situation of interest to National Security expires, unless extended (RD 681/2026, art. 4).

Attribution and evidence: what supports each hypothesis

The central attribution question — who organised the entry — is assessed through four hypotheses that are not mutually exclusive. The table separates what supports each one from its limits.

H1
JUDGMENT
MODERATE

Effect of the ruling and trafficking networks — Contributing factor

SUPPORTING ELEMENTS

STS 814/2026; matching statements from Spain's and Morocco's Interior Ministries; social-media calls with 180,000 followers; a prior rise in swimming entries.

Diagnosticity

LOW. Compatible with H2 and H3; does not distinguish between them.

LIMITS AND COUNTER-EVIDENCE

It does not by itself explain the scale or the passivity described in several reports.

H2
JUDGMENT
MODERATE

Moroccan permissiveness during the Feast of the Throne — Preliminary support

SUPPORTING ELEMENTS

CENIF describes a pattern linking mass crossings to national holidays; an Audiencia Nacional order on "facilitative handling"; a video geolocated by Newtral in Fnideq showing uniforms consistent with Moroccan forces.

Diagnosticity

MEDIUM. Distinguishes passivity from normal surveillance, but not intent.

LIMITS AND COUNTER-EVIDENCE

Newtral warns that an isolated video does not prove what the officers were doing or the exact date. Le360 acknowledges the geolocation and calls for the same caution.

H3**JUDGMENT****LOW****Active direction of the crossings with a territorial objective —
Under investigation****SUPPORTING ELEMENTS**

According to press reports, a CENIF report (55 pages) sent to the Audiencia Nacional, not officially published: a planned process, guided by uniformed and plainclothes gendarmes; the Audiencia Nacional opened a case for a possible offence against territorial integrity.

LIMITS AND COUNTER-EVIDENCE

The Government maintains there is no conclusive proof; Albares recalls that Bourita denied involvement; Morocco's Prosecutor's Office opened investigations; Le360 calls the report unfounded. The case is at the preliminary stage. The AMDH and outside experts describe absence or permissiveness, not direction (section 08B). Context: CESEDEN reads the 2021 entry as pressure over Western Sahara (p. 165); since 2022 Spain has backed Moroccan autonomy (p. 168), so that incentive does not automatically carry over to 2026 (J&H inference). On 20 July, ten days before 30 July, Sánchez visited Algiers to normalise relations (La Moncloa); this may have raised Rabat's strategic sensitivity, but there is no public evidence of a causal link.

Diagnosticity

MEDIUM. The images analysed are consistent with active guidance, but there are as yet no documented orders.

H4**JUDGMENT****MODERATE****Subsequent instrumentalisation by third parties — Later phase****SUPPORTING ELEMENTS**

Maldita.es documents the "#FreeCeuta" narrative spread by accounts identifying as Israeli or pro-Israel, and a montage attributed to the Russian Pravda network; Sánchez attributed the later spread of hoaxes to Russian, Israeli and far-right networks.

LIMITS AND COUNTER-EVIDENCE

Maldita.es finds no evidence of foreign interference that contributed to triggering events prior to 30 July. Israel publicly rejected the Spanish accusation; that denial is recorded as a party's position, not as substantive counter-evidence.

Diagnosticity

Does not discriminate between H1, H2 and H3: it is subsequent to the event.

EVIDENCE THAT WOULD ACTUALLY DISCRIMINATE H3

COLLECTION REQUIREMENT

(i) Orders or operational communications issued by a Moroccan state authority; (ii) Moroccan responses to letters rogatory or judicial cooperation requests; (iii) a complete chronology of Moroccan deployments from 29 to 31 July, rather than isolated videos; (iv) statements from officers or witnesses before the court. Until any of these appears, most of the available evidence is compatible with several hypotheses at once.

J&H ANALYTICAL VIEW

H1, H2 and H3 are compatible with one another: an entry facilitated by a network ecosystem, combined with permissiveness in surveillance, is consistent with varying degrees of intent. The strategic difference lies in whether there was state direction, and only the judicial investigation can settle that. Until then, J&H recommends planning on the basis of H1 and H2 while keeping H3 as an open hypothesis: if the investigation confirmed it, R2 and R4 would need to be revised.

NOT USED AS EVIDENCE

Leaks attributed to the "Jabaroot" group (unverified). The decoration awarded by Spain's Interior Ministry to a senior Moroccan security official, approved in 2019 and presented on 11 November 2025 according to Newtral, does not by itself prove involvement in the events of July.

08B · DEEP DIVE (II)

Third parties: what Morocco, the US and Israel say, and where they contradict themselves

A survey of Moroccan, US and Israeli sources as of 24 September. Statements are recorded as FACT and contradictions are flagged. No new evidence changes the status of hypotheses H1–H4.

ACTOR	WHAT THEY SAY OR DO	ALERT OR CONTRADICTION	SOURCE
Morocco · State	On 10-Sep, its first official reaction: denies any involvement ("no data, fact or report"), rejects being a "pre-	Harsher than what Albares attributes to Bourita (electoral context). Coincides on the same day with the	Público, El Independiente, Mundiario (10–11 Sep)

ACTOR	WHAT THEY SAY OR DO	ALERT OR CONTRADICTION	SOURCE
	election pawn" or "scapegoat", warns of "recurring tensions", notes that "geographic proximity is an immutable fact", and calls for the return of the minors.	Sahrawi law and the announcement of the royal visit, neither of which the text mentions.	
Morocco · civil society	The AMDH (8 Aug) speaks of an absence of security forces, of 59 people prosecuted in Tetouan and 52 in Nador, of taxi drivers sentenced to up to six months, and of a State that spoke out only after four days.	Contradicts both "active direction" and official "preventive measures". A militant-leaning source; its own figures do not add up consistently (81 + 63 bodies versus "at least 141").	AMDH (Arabic)
Morocco · local press	On 15-Aug, 294 people detained near Ceuta (248 sub-Saharan, 46 Moroccan), a provisional figure.	A sign of preventive deployment on a called date; consistent with cooperation.	achtari24 (Arabic)
US · Executive branch	Trump and the White House use Ceuta in the November midterm campaign. The State Department blamed the Spanish Government for "facilitating" migration, but its spokesperson said it supports Spanish sovereignty "without reservation" and called for the migrants to be removed.	Criticism of Madrid and formal backing of sovereignty at the same time. Pre-existing tension over the Rota and Morón bases.	France 24, Euronews, Hespress via Politico

ACTOR	WHAT THEY SAY OR DO	ALERT OR CONTRADICTION	SOURCE
US · Congress	House Appropriations Committee Report 119-631, with no force of law, accompanies the bill the House passed on 15 Jul by 217 votes to 209; it describes Ceuta and Melilla as "located in Moroccan territory" and supports dialogue on their "future status".	Contradicts the State Department's line. Opinion pieces call for recognising Moroccan sovereignty; these are not official policy.	Yabiladi, Morocco World News
Israel	The ambassador to the UN, Danon, spoke of "colonial enclaves" (30 Jul); the ambassador in Madrid said this does not represent Israel's position. Sa'ar called Sánchez's accusation a lie.	Internal Israeli misalignment. The Spanish accusations of involvement have no public evidence, according to the Times of Israel and Maldita.es.	JNS, Times of Israel
European Parliament	In the 15-Sep debate, two MEPs (The Left and Renew) questioned how Ceuta fits within Spain. Two days later, the resolution reaffirmed its sovereignty "beyond any doubt" (339–225–16).	A divergence between positions expressed during the parliamentary debate and the subsequent vote. The 225 votes against do not amount to questioning sovereignty.	Yabiladi, La Cerca
Experts	Fabiani (ICG) sees an operation that was not orchestrated but was permitted by Rabat; Amirah-Fernández speaks of "hybrid tactics".	Nuances H3 and supports H2. Original outlet not identified (reproduction).	New York Metropolitan

J&H ANALYTICAL VIEW**JUDGMENT****MODERATE**

No actor has formally changed its position on sovereignty: the State Department reaffirms it, Israel disavows its envoy, and Morocco maintains its historical claim. What emerges are contradictory messages within the US, the European Parliament and Israel. The short-term risk is not a formal change of position, but the erosion of the consensus underpinning sovereignty as a non-negotiable matter.

Sources with full links in the annex (section 11). Most US and Israeli positions are known second-hand.

09 · RECOMMENDATIONS**What to do, depending on the decision-maker's profile**

The recommendations are J&H ASSESSMENTS, conditional on how the indicators in section 07 evolve. They do not depend on resolving the debate over authorship.

ORGANISATIONS AND OPERATORS PRESENT IN CEUTA AND THE STRAIT**Turn border uncertainty into a trigger-based continuity plan**

1. Consider mapping dependency on the Tarajal land border, on the port — including the Poniente area, occupied by the reception facility — and on maritime connections.
2. Consider tying activation of the contingency plan to the indicators in rows 1 to 5 of section 07, rather than to headlines.
3. Review applicable clauses and coverage and exposure to cost overruns with suppliers and users.
4. Consider defining security and communication protocols for staff and assets around the dates on the critical calendar.

INSTITUTIONS AND PUBLIC DECISION-MAKERS

Dual channel and operational gap: points worth weighing

1. Consider maintaining operational cooperation with Rabat on returns and containment, with the legal safeguards of the procedure (art. 58 of LO 4/2000, international protection, and the best interests of the child) and without yielding on the position on territorial integrity; this is the line the Government states it follows and is compatible with the European Parliament resolution, which calls simultaneously for reinforced cooperation and respect for territorial integrity.
2. Consider closing the legal-operational gap opened by STS 814/2026: the Court itself notes that maritime barriers could restore the special regime; Vivas is calling for the law to be amended.
3. Consider strengthening coordination of the alert chain between the Interior Ministry, the National Police, the CNI and the Government Delegation: the declassified documents show prior warnings and requests to reinforce the Civil Guard, whose operational response the Audiencia Nacional is examining.
4. Consider anchoring the response within the European framework: emergency funds, Frontex and implementation of the Migration and Asylum Pact, as the European Parliament is calling for.
5. Consider factoring into security and communications planning the two undated political triggers — the royal visit and the Sahrawi nationality law — and the Moroccan response already flagged in the 10-Sep statement.

ANALYTICAL FOLLOW-UP

Updating and source bias

1. Update the analysis after the Moroccan elections, recalibrating the bands and the dashboard, using open sources only.
2. Broaden the contrast with independent Moroccan press in Arabic and with primary documentation from Rabat, known today only through third parties.
3. Follow the Audiencia Nacional investigation and its possible impact on hypotheses H2 and H3.

WHAT WE DO NOT RECOMMEND

Adopting state attribution as a planning premise ahead of a judicial ruling, or dismissing it on the same basis. Both positions overstate a certainty that does not currently exist.

10 · METHODOLOGY, SOURCES AND RECONCILIATION**How this report was built****SOURCE ASYMMETRY**

Source asymmetry. The analysis draws mainly on Spanish media and bodies, in Spanish. The Moroccan perspective now also comes from Arabic, French and English-language media (Hespress, Yabiladi, Le360, Morocco World News, local northern press) and from the AMDH, but almost always through third parties: the primary texts of Morocco's Foreign Ministry have not been accessed. US and Israeli positions come from press coverage and second-hand statements. Algerian sources have still not been cross-checked. This asymmetry could bias the reading. Among Spanish sources, outlets with differing editorial lines coexist; they have been used only for verifiable data, not for characterisations ("invasion", "aggression"), which J&H does not adopt. The CESEDEN chapter provides framing but does not correct this asymmetry.

Epistemic taxonomy

FACT: verifiable data from an identified source; it does not include causal relationships, which are JUDGMENT. JUDGMENT: analytical reading of facts. ASSESSMENT: appraisal of impact or advisability. ESTIMATE: a J&H calculation or threshold. J&H SCENARIO: a conditional trajectory.

Source level: primary (official text read in full), partial primary (located, partly read), secondary (press, fact-checker or repository), referenced (cited by third parties, not located), or pending cross-checking. In the text, references underlined in gold are active links to the cited source; each source's level is indicated in the annex and in this section.

Confidence: HIGH, MODERATE or LOW. Bands: Very low 5–20 · Low 20–40 · Medium 40–60 · High 60–80 · Very high 80–95.

Reconciliation notes

- STS 814/2026: dated 29 June (Confilegal, Moncloa.com); the CGPJ communicated it on 8 July. Several sources cite both dates.
- Deaths: 11, 41, 43 (AP, 31 Jul), at least 60 (Boston Globe), 75, 83, 88 and 141 depending on source and date; the AMDH adds up 81 and 63 bodies (144) and also cites "at least 141". Figures are presented without merging them.
- Returns, rejections and expulsions: these are distinct legal categories (border rejection, return under art. 58 of LO 4/2000, expulsion, voluntary return) and the public figures do not separate them. References to returns are to be understood with the legal safeguards of the procedure, with particular attention to minors (art. 35 of LO 4/2000; the 11-Sep-2025 ruling by the Cádiz provincial court in Ceuta, which convicted two former Ceuta officials of malfeasance for returning 55 minors without due process; a first-instance ruling, not final).
- Entries: ≈40,000 (Moroccan Interior Ministry), 60,000 (Ceuta, 31 Jul), 70,000–80,000 (Spanish figures).
- "Moncloa": lamoncloa.gob.es is the Government; moncloa.com is a digital news outlet.
- 10,000 in Ceuta: attributed by Europa Press to unidentified "government sources".
- Ceuta's population: ≈83,000 (INE, cited by Newtral and EP); the percentage calculation is shown in section 04.
- The 2021 entry: more than 8,000 in 48 hours (Interior Ministry, cited by moncloa.com) versus nine thousand, 1,500 of them minors (CESEDEN, p. 165). These have not been merged.

Information gaps and source levels

- Referenced: a quote attributed to Sánchez about the Moroccan gendarmerie; an estimate that Ceuta's GDP fell by more than 10% (elEconomista, no methodology given); a proposed bilateral commission attributed to Minister Ouahbi; a report from the European Parliament's research service (EPRS, 10-Sep), cited by Hespress EN and EU Today and not located.
- Secondary: the text of the European Parliament's 17-Sep resolution, known through La Cerca, Newtral, Yabiladi and InfoMigrants; the Moroccan Foreign Ministry statement (10-Sep) and the State Department's statement, known through press coverage; the state of progress of the Sahrawi nationality law; a Yabiladi headline (18-Sep) on the extradition of a network ringleader, not read.
- Partial primary: Law 40/2015 (consolidated BOE text; arts. 72–73 and 2nd Additional Provision cross-checked with Iberley and the Senate); Regulation (EU) 2024/1356 (only its official summary consulted); RD 705/2026 (its annex, verified via RD 718/2026; the single article itself has not been read); Report 119-631 (Congress.gov; the passage on Ceuta is known through quotations, not a full reading).
- Pending cross-checking: the date of the royal visit and the exact 20-day deadline for the port facility's file; objective economic data (port passenger and cargo traffic, hotel occupancy, employment registrations, layoffs and business closures, card spending); weekly series of swimming entries and returns; primary Rabat statements and Algerian sources.

Source selection criteria

- Primary and institutional: BOE, EUR-Lex and Congress.gov (official texts); the Spanish Government (declassified reports), the CGPJ (communication of the ruling) and CESEDEN. The European Parliament is known only through press coverage.
- Fact-checkers: Maldita.es and Newtral, used for figures, chronologies and hoax verification.
- General and wire-service press: EFE, Europa Press, Infobae, Público, Euronews, El Independiente.
- Press with an editorial line critical of the Government: El Español, The Objective, Libertad Digital. Used only for documentary data (for example, the content of the CENIF report or the CCOE note).
- Moroccan media: Hespress, Yabiladi, Le360, Morocco World News; cited as Moroccan coverage or position, not as verification. AMDH: a Moroccan human-rights NGO, critical of the State and with militant-leaning language ("occupied"); used for its own data and complaints, attributed as such.
- US and Israeli media: France 24, Euronews, Times of Israel, JNS; JNS has an editorial line close to Israel. Government statements are cited as attributed.
- Academic: OIE (University of Granada) is a personal academic project and does not represent the institution; used as a cross-reference chronology.
- CESEDEN (Ministry of Defence): chapter 6 of the Strategic Outlook 2026 is a signed academic text, not a Ministry position; the volume itself states this. It was published on 9 April 2026 and its bibliography runs to January 2026, so it does not cover the July crisis. Used only as framing and context, not as evidence of the events of 2026.

Excluded from the analysis

- Leaks from the "Jabaroot" group (unverified).
- Public-safety and tourism figures from outlets of unverified reliability, even when they circulate in other publications.
- Social-media posts without independent verification.

Calculations shown

- Weight of the residual migrant population: $10,000 \div 83,000 \approx 12\%$; $13,000 \div 83,000 \approx 16\%$.
- Pace of returns: 5,603 between 10 August and 16 September (37 days $\approx$ 5.3 weeks) $\Rightarrow \approx 1,060$ a week. The thresholds in section 07 are J&H estimates anchored to those references.
- Swimming entries: 279 from 20 to 26 July (Ceuta and Melilla), 195 more than the previous week (CCOE); ≈ 84 the week before ($279 - 195$).

Limits of the report

Cut off as of 24 September 2026, with an update after the 20-Sep call and the 23-Sep Moroccan elections (see the update at the start of the report). Probability bands are J&H judgments, not statistical projections. The precedents of 2016–2019 and 2021 are cited as context and do not change the bands. The traceability of the bands is kept in an internal annex not intended for external circulation. This report does not assess the conduct of any institution nor the attribution of the events. A non-commercial document, produced using open sources; it does not require or presuppose access to non-public information. The CENIF report is known only through press coverage and is treated as referenced, not as evidence.

On foreign-influence content

A search was made for content from registered campaigns (Clock Tower X, Hanover Institute) linked to Ceuta, and none was found; none has been used. The positions of the Israeli and US governments are recorded as attributed statements. The reach figure for antisemitic messages cited by the Times of Israel comes from an advocacy organisation and is not used as data.

11 · SOURCE ANNEX

Sources with full links

Consulted between 19 and 20 September 2026. Bracketed numbers indicate the sections where each source is used. Where the full content of a source could not be accessed, the data point was incorporated only as a secondary reference and remained subject to later verification. Links are active: simply click them. Some outlets shorten their own URLs, so a link may look incomplete yet still work. Titles are given in their original Spanish, French or Arabic where that is the language of the outlet, to avoid misrepresenting the source.

- 1 **Maldita.es · El cruce de miles de personas a Ceuta desde Marruecos en julio de 2026 (30-VII, act. 7-VIII) [§1, §2, §3]** FACT-CHECKERS

<https://maldita.es/desinfo/20260730/entrada-masiva-de-inmigrantes-logran-acceder-a-ceuta-a-traves-del-espigon-del-tarajal/>

- 2 **Maldita.es · El baile de cifras sobre los migrantes en Ceuta (18-IX) [§1, §2, §7]** FACT-CHECKERS

<https://maldita.es/control-del-poder/20260918/cronologia-cifras-migrantes-ceuta/>

- 3 **Maldita.es · Ceuta y las campañas de desinformación e injerencia extranjera (2-IX) [§5, §8]**

FACT-CHECKERS

<https://maldita.es/desinfo/20260902/ceuta-campanas-desinformacion-injerencia-extranjera-fimi/>

4 Gobierno de España (La Moncloa) · Publicación de los informes y comunicaciones sobre la situación de Ceuta (9-IX) [§2] INSTITUTIONAL AND OFFICIAL

<https://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/consejodeministros/paginas/informes-y-comunicaciones-situacion-ceuta.aspx>

5 donporque · ¿Qué revelan los 40 informes desclasificados sobre la crisis de Ceuta? [§2] SPANISH PRESS

<https://donporque.com/informes-desclasificados-sobre-ceuta/>

6 Mundiario · Desclasificación: el CNI avisó a la Delegación del Gobierno un día antes (9- IX) [§2, §8] SPANISH PRESS

<https://www.mundiario.com/articulo/politica/cni-aviso-marruecos-delegacion-guardia-civil-asalto-ceuta-dia-antes-avalancha/20260909221921440213.html>

7 The Objective · Los tres informes del CNI, la Policía y la Guardia Civil un día antes (9- IX) [§2, §7] SPANISH PRESS

<https://theobjective.com/espana/2026-09-09/tres-informes-ceuta-cni-policia-guardia-civil/>

8 Libertad Digital · Los documentos desclasificados evidencian que el CNI y la Policía avisaron (9-IX) [§8] SPANISH PRESS

<https://www.libertaddigital.com/espana/2026-09-09/los-documentos-desclasificados-por-moncloa-evidencian-que-el-cni-y-la-policia-avisaron-del-asalto-masivo-a-ceuta-7457494/>

9 El Español · La Policía informa a la juez de que la invasión de Ceuta fue guiada por gendarmes marroquíes (1-IX) [§1, §8] SPANISH PRESS

https://www.elespanol.com/espana/tribunales/20260901/policia-informa-juez-invasion-ceuta-guiada-gendarmes-marroquies-ordenes-agentes-paisano-fin-distinto-migratorio/1003744369590_0.html

10 Público · La Audiencia Nacional pone el foco en la respuesta de las autoridades españolas y en el papel de los gendarmes marroquíes [§1, §8] SPANISH PRESS

<https://www.publico.es/politica/tribunales/audiencia-nacional-pone-foco-respuesta-autoridades-espanolas-ceuta-papel-gendarmes-marroquies.html>

11 Público · Instrucción de la Audiencia Nacional sobre la actuación de las autoridades intervinientes [§6] SPANISH PRESS

<https://www.publico.es/politica/tribunales/jueza-audiencia-nacional-asume-investigacion-delegado-gobierno-ceuta.html>

12 Euronews · Audiencia Nacional: instrucción sobre las autoridades intervinientes (14-IX) [§6]

SPANISH PRESS

<https://es.euronews.com/my-europe/2026/09/14/audiencia-nacional-pide-investigar-delegado-del-gobierno-ceuta-por-entradas-masivas>

13 moncloa.com (medio digital) · Ceuta: gestión favorecedora desde Marruecos (8-IX) [§1]

SPANISH PRESS

<https://www.moncloa.com/2026/09/08/ceuta-gestion-desde-marruecos-3427569>

14 moncloa.com (medio digital) · La Guardia Civil entrega a la jueza el informe sobre los avisos (4-IX) [§4]

SPANISH PRESS

<https://www.moncloa.com/2026/09/04/guardia-civil-informe-entrada-masiva-ceuta-34261>

15 moncloa.com (medio digital) · Sánchez en el Congreso: cerco de PP y Vox (3-IX) [§4]

SPANISH PRESS

<https://www.moncloa.com/2026/09/03/sanchez-congreso-ceuta-cerco-pp-vox-3425223/>

16 elDiario.es · Última hora política, 3 de septiembre de 2026 [§7]

SPANISH PRESS

https://www.eldiario.es/politica/ultima-hora-comparecencia-pedro-sanchez-ceuta-actualidad-politica-directo_6_13483856.html

17 La Cerca (resolución del PE) · La Eurocámara respalda la soberanía española sobre Ceuta (17-IX) [§1, §4, §6]

SPANISH PRESS

<https://www.lacerca.com/noticias/espana/eurocamara-soberania-ceuta-reclama-reforzar-fronteras-exige-espanol-829022-1.html>

18 Newtral · Preguntas y respuestas de la resolución aprobada por el PE sobre Ceuta (18- IX) [§2, §6]

FACT-CHECKERS

<https://www.newtral.es/resolucion-ceuta-parlamento-europeo/20260918/>

19 Newtral · Qué sabemos sobre la condecoración al director de Seguridad Nacional marroquí (16-IX) [§8]

FACT-CHECKERS

<https://www.newtral.es/condecoracion-jefe-seguridad-marruecos/20260916/>

20 CGPJ · El Tribunal Supremo confirma que la ley no permite las devoluciones en caliente a nado (8-VII) [§1, §4]

INSTITUTIONAL AND OFFICIAL

<https://www.poderjudicial.es/cgpj/es/Poder-Judicial/Noticias-Judiciales/El-Tribunal-Supremo-confirma-que-la-ley-no-permite-las-devoluciones-en-caliente-de-los-migrantes-que-p-retenden-entrar-a-nado-en-Ceuta-y-Melilla>

21 **Confilegal · La sentencia del Supremo sobre entradas a nado en Ceuta, STS 814/2026 de 29 de junio [§1]** **SPANISH PRESS**

<https://confilegal.com/20260730-sts-2965-2026-ceuta-rechazo-frontera-cruces-nado/>

22 **Infobae · La AN reclama al Gobierno los expedientes del campamento del puerto (19- IX) [§2, §7]** **SPANISH PRESS**

<https://www.infobae.com/espana/2026/09/19/la-audiencia-nacional-reclama-al-gobierno-los-expedientes-del-campamento-del-puerto-ceuta-instalado-y-ocupado-ya-pese-al-recurso-de-la-policia-por-riesgos-de-seguridad/>

23 **moncloa.com (medio digital) · La Audiencia Nacional avala el campamento del puerto de Ceuta (18-IX) [§2, §4]** **SPANISH PRESS**

<https://www.moncloa.com/2026/09/18/audiencia-nacional-avala-campamento-puerto-ceuta-3433314/>

24 **Infobae / EFE · Albares avisa de que las reclamaciones marroquíes degradan la relación (8-IX) [§4, §7]** **SPANISH PRESS**

<https://www.infobae.com/espana/agencias/2026/09/08/albares-avisa-que-las-reclamaciones-marroquies-de-ceuta-y-melilla-degradan-la-relacion/>

25 **El Independiente · Albares sobre soberanía y conversaciones con Marruecos (28-VIII) [§5, §6]** **SPANISH PRESS**

<https://www.elindependiente.com/espana/2026/08/28/albares-soberania-espanola-ceuta-melilla-conversaciones-marruecos/>

26 **El Independiente · Ceuta y Melilla protagonizan la campaña electoral en Marruecos (13-IX) [§4]** **SPANISH PRESS**

<https://www.elindependiente.com/internacional/2026/09/13/ceuta-melilla-protagonizan-campana-electoral-marruecos/>

27 **Infobae / EFE · La campaña para las legislativas marroquíes arranca marcada por una retórica nacionalista (10-IX) [§4, §7]** **SPANISH PRESS**

<https://www.infobae.com/america/agencias/2026/09/10/la-campana-para-las-legislativas-marroquies-arranca-marcada-por-una-retorica-nacionalista/>

28 **Euronews · Italia prorroga otros 15 días los controles fronterizos con España (15-IX) [§5, §7]** **SPANISH PRESS**

<https://es.euronews.com/my-europe/2026/09/15/italia-prorroga-otros-15-dias-los-controles-fronterizos-con-espana>

29 moncloa.com (medio digital) · Interior prorroga los controles con Italia (16-IX) [\$7]

SPANISH PRESS

<https://www.moncloa.com/2026/09/16/interior-controles-fronterizos-schengen-italia-3432079>

30 Infodefensa · Colomina: si España invoca el artículo 5 por Ceuta, la alianza respondería (17-IX) [\$4]

SPANISH PRESS

<https://www.infodefensa.com/texto-diario/mostrar/6019011/javier-colomina-representante-o-tan-vecindad-sur-cree-espana-invoca-articulo-5-agresion-ceuta-alianza-responderia>

31 Ceutaldia · 33 millones de pérdidas por la crisis fronteriza de Ceuta (30-VIII) [\$1, \$4]

SPANISH PRESS

<https://www.ceutaldia.com/articulo/economia/33-millones-perdidas-tesis-fronteriza-ceuta-comercio-hosteleria-sufren-mayores-caidas/20260830153711319452.html>

32 El Español · Sin sorpresas en las elecciones de Marruecos: gana el PAM en unos comicios marcados por la abstención, que fue del 61,9% (24-IX) [\$1, \$4, \$7, \$8B]

SPANISH PRESS

https://www.elespanol.com/mundo/africa/20260924/sin-sorpresas-elecciones-marruecos-gana-pam-comicios-marcados-abstencion/1003744394988_0.html

33 COPE · El PAM gana en Marruecos en unas elecciones marcadas por una abstención del 61,9% (24-IX) [\$1, \$4]

SPANISH PRESS

https://www.cope.es/actualidad/internacional/noticias/pam-gana-marruecos-elecciones-marcadas-abrumadora-abstencion-61-alta-20-anos-20260924_3442609.html

34 donporque · ¿Quién ganó las elecciones de Marruecos y qué cambia para España? (24-IX) [\$4, \$7]

SPANISH PRESS

<https://donporque.com/quien-gano-las-elecciones-de-marruecos-y-que-cambia-para-espana/>

35 Euronews · Ceuta: el Tarajal amanece en calma tras el llamamiento a una nueva entrada masiva (23-IX) [\$1, \$7]

SPANISH PRESS

<https://es.euronews.com/2026/09/23/tarajal-amanece-calma-llamamiento-nueva-entrada-masiva>

36 Infobae / EFE · Normalidad en la frontera de Ceuta en el día del llamamiento a una nueva entrada masiva (23-IX) [\$1, \$7]

SPANISH PRESS

<https://www.infobae.com/espana/agencias/2026/09/23/normalidad-en-la-frontera-de-ceuta-en-el-dia-del-llamamiento-a-una-nueva-entrada-masiva/>

- 37 El Cierre Digital · El CNI vigila la frontera ante posibles asaltos por las elecciones de Marruecos: 23-S, fecha «roja» en Ceuta y Melilla (22-IX) [§1, §7] SPANISH PRESS**

<https://elcierredigital.com/investigacion/cni-vigila-frontera-ante-posibles-asaltos-por-elecciones-marruecos-23-s-fecha-roja-ceuta-melilla>

- 38 Canal Sur · La frontera de Ceuta y Melilla, blindadas y en calma el día de las elecciones en Marruecos (23-IX) [§1, §7] SPANISH PRESS**

https://www.canalsur.es/noticias/espana/frontera-ceuta-melilla-blindada-calma_1_1438054.html

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